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CASE COMMENTS
BOUNDARIES-CONVEYANCE TO POINT "NEWR' AND AL NG INE "JUST
BEmow" ROAD DloEs NOT MAKE ROAD BOUNDARY SO AS TO TRANsFER EASEMENT.-A deed from appellees to appellants conveyed the property to a
point "near" road and along line "just below" road. Some four years
after the conveyance, the grantors erected a wire and post fence across
the road near a corner of the parcel of land conveyed. The grantees
asked that the obstruction of the road be enjoined. Held, that the deed
conveying as it did to point "near" road and along line "just below"
road did not make the road a boundary so as to pass an easement
therein to the grantee, reference to the road for purpose of description
only being insufficient. Bates, et al. v. Johnson, et al., 217 Ky. 673, 290
S. W. 474.
The case at hand recognizes the established exception to the rule
that if one, in conveying land, describes it as bounded by a street, he is
estopped as against his grantee to deny that it is a street. The exception which is quite as generally applied as the rule itself has been ably
stated by the Massachusetts court in the case of McKenzie v. Gleason,
184 Mass. 452, 69 N. E. 1076. In that case the deed described the property as bounded by the "northerly side of said road." The court held
that where, by the description of a deed, the road by which the property was bounded was excluded, the grantor was not estopped to deny
.the road's existenbe. An earlier case decided by the same court
furnishes an interesting contrast. Driscoll v. Smith, 184 Mass. 221, 68
N. E. 210.
In the proper case there may be two sound bases upon which to
rest such an exception to the general rule. The simpler foundation for
the exception is to hold that the road was referred to merely for the
purpose of locating the starting point of the description. Lankin v.
Terwilliger, 22 Ore. 27, 29 Pac. 268; Hoffman v. Trustees of Town of
Shepherdsville, 18 Ky. L. 302, 36 S. W. 522. The more logical basis seems
to be to hold that since the easement passes to the grantee by implication in the case of the rule, such an implication is obviated when the
road npmed as a boundary is expressly excluded from the grant. Van
Winkle v. Van Winkle, 80 N. Y. S. 612. The Kentucky Court of Appeals apparently thought the first named basis was sufficient in the
present case.
G. R.
CONTRACTS-VA aDIT" oF ExEcuToRy CONTRACT DEPENDS ON MUTUAL.

=.-Action for damages for breach of an alleged contract by which
appellee agreed to pay appellant so much a ton for hauling ice over
a certain period. The appellant did not state that he positively agreed
to do the hauling at the price and for the period stated. On the contrary he testified as follows: "I said I will try it for a while at that,
and if I can make good at it, I will haul it." There was a directed
verdict for the appellee.
The court held that where it was left to one of the parties whether
he will proceed or abandon the contract, and he may do this at any
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time without incuring any liability thereunder, the contract was not
binding upon either; that mutuality of obligation is essential to the
validity of an executory contract; and that since the appellant -by his
own evidence showed that he was not bound, there was no error in the
court's directing a verdict for the appellee. Combs v. Hazard, Ice &
Storage Co., 218 Ky. 29, 290 S. W. 1035.
Mutuality of obligation is an essential element of every enforce,able contract. St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co. v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 296 Fed. 749; Canaday v. Southern Land Development Co.,
147 Ark. 120, 227 S. W. 26; Radetsky v. Palmer, 70 Colo. 146, 199 P.
490; Peyton v. Peyton, 31 Ga. A. 327, 120 S. E. 689; Hilker v. Curdes,
77 Ind. A. 466, 133 N. E. 851; Hallgarten v. Wolkerstein, 198 N. Y. S.
485; Rogers v. Larrimore& Perkins, 188 Ky. 468, 222 S. W. 512; Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Snowden, 182 Ky. 325, 206 S. W.
487; Rehm-Zeiher Co..v. F. G. Walker & Co., 156 Ky. 6, 160 S. W. 777,
49 L. R. A. (N. S.); Brown v. Allen, 204 Ky. 76, 263 S. W. 717.
Where one party can abandon the contract at any time there
seems to be no doubt that the contract is not binding on the other.
Where unforeseen conditions are to release one of the parties, or where
the contract is to be binding on both parties unless certain events
come about, the courts have endeavored to uphold such contracts as
not being unenforceable for lack of mutuality. In Brilgeford & Co. v.
Meagher, 144 Ky. 479, 139 S. W. 750, the appellee agreed to hire appellant for a period of three years, provided his work was satisfactory
to the appellee, and pfovided the appellee remained in the same business for that period. The appellant was dismissed at the end of the
first year, and he sued appellee for the breach of the contract. The
appellee set up lack of mutuality of obligation. The court held that
the agreement was not one where one of the parties could step out at
any time, but that both parties were bound as long as the company
stayed in existence and the employee performed in a workmanlike
manner. The Kentucky court has held the same where a workman,
'whose hand was cut off while engaged at his duties, was promised
permanent employment by his employer in consideration of the injured man's promise not to sue the employer. L. d- N. R. R. Co. v. Cox,
145 Ky. 667, 141 S. W. 389. The employer promised the employee a
position as long as it did business in Kenton County. The court said
for such a term there was an implication that the servant was properly to perform his duties, and might be disliarged by the master
for any cause that would justify the discharge of a servant employed
for a fixed term.
In Rehm-Zeiher Co. v. F. G. Walker Co., supra, the court held that
a contract between a buyer and a distiller whereby the distiller was to
furnish a certain amount of whiskey each year during several years,
providing that, if for any "unforeseen reason," the buyer could not use
the full amount, he should be released, was unenforceable for want
of mutuality. The words "unforeseen reason" were not explained in
the contract and it appeared that any reason the appellant might have
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brought forth would -have been good under the wording of the agreenent. In Crane v. C. Crane and Co., 105 Fed. 869, it was held that where
a coal dealer agreed to furnish the operator of an established factory
all the coal that might be required in the operation of that factory
there was not a want of mutuality. The operator could have demanded
that the coal dealer furnish all the coal he might have required, and
the dealer could have demanded that all the coal that was purchased
by the operator be taken from him. The Kentucky court cited this
case in Rehm-Zeiher Co. v. F. G. Walker, supra. The court, however,
contended that it did not appear that the appellant had an established
business or that it would have been liable under the contract because
of the indefiniteness of the clause, "unforeseen reason." So it appears
that where one of the parties cannot be held under any circumstances,
the contract will not be binding, but on the other hand if both parties
are bound although performance might or might not come about, that
is if the contract is based on contingencies, the happening of which
release both parties, then there is mutuality, as both parties are bound
to perform until the event happens. Taking this into consideration
it seems that the contract in the principal case was one where only one
of the parties was bound, and -that it was decided in accordance with
J. S. F.
the weight of the authority.
CRIMINAL LAw-CIRcUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE is INSUFFICIENT TO SUrPORT CONVICTION IF IT IS AS CONSISTENT WITH DEFENDANT'S INNOCENCE
AS WITH His GunT.-Appellant was convicted of unlawfully manufac-

turing intoxicating liquors. Officers discovered within less than a
quarter of a mile of the appellant's home, a still, which was equipped
with a boiler and furnace; also some beer and two barrels of mash.
The still was not shown to be located on appellant's land. The appellant, who was hunting squirrels, while passing near the still was
arrested by the officers.

Held, that circumstantial

evidence being

equally consistent with defendant's innocence as with his guilt would
not support conviction. Jones v. Commonwealth, 217 Ky. 427, 289 S. W.
676.
The rule that a conviction in a criminal case may be had upon
circumstantial evidence alone is subject to the qualification that If the
,evidence be as consistent with defendant's innocence as with his guilt,
it is insufficient to support the conviction. Daniels v. Commonwealth,
194 Ky. 513, 240 S. W. 67; Hill v. Commonwealth, 191 Ky. 477, 230 S. W.
'910; Denton v. Commonwealth, 188 Ky. 30, 221, S. W. 202; Afalins v.
-Commonwealth, 196 Ky. 681, 245 S. W. 285. To justify a jury in convicting the accused, the circumstance proved must be susceptible of explanation upon no reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence.
People v. Dick, 32 Cal. 213; Schusler v. State, 29 Ind. 394; Williams
v. State, 41 Texas, 209. In the case of Schuler v. State, supra, the court
decided that it was not enough that the mystery of the crime can not
be solved from the evidence except upon the supposition of the defendant's guilt. In People v. Lambert, 5 Mich. 367, Campbell, J., delivering
the opinion of the court, said: "Circumstantial evidence of a conclusive
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nature may often avail where direct testimony is inaccessible. But
it must be testimony not reasonably capable of any other interpreta.
tion. It must be testimony from which nothing but guilt can, in the
natural order of things, be deduced." The federal rule is in accord with
-the rule laid down in the principal case. United State&v. Green, 146
Fed. 803, judgment affirmed, Green v. United States, 154 Fed. 401,
certiorari denied, 207 U. S. 596.
It is submitted that the decision of the Kentucky court in the
Instant case is sound both on reason and principle and finds support in
the adjudicated cases of a majority of the jurisdictions.
B. C.
Can nAL LAw-REYusAL TO GRANT A CHANGE or VENuE WmL NOT
BE INTERFERED WITH EXCEPT roa ABusn OF DiscuRroN.-Defendant was
found guilty of burglary. He had moved for a change of venue giving
In support of his motion the affidavits of seventy-eight witnesses, each
of whom deposed that the general opinion in the county was that the
defendant was guilty and should be speedily tried and severely punished, and that consequently under such conditions the defendant could
not receive a fair and impartial trial at the hands of a jury from that
county. Fifty-eight of defendant's witnesses, however, were non-residents of the county. The Commonwealth introduced seventeen witnesses, all residents and substantial citizens of the county, who stated
that public sentiment and feeling were not such as to prevent the defendant's receiving a fair and Impartial trial. Held, the discretion of
the circuit court in refusing to grant a change of venue will not be
interfered with unless the Court of Appeals is satisfied that discretion
has been abused. Schleeter v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 73, 290 S. W.
1075.
The court in deciding this case under section 1109, Kentucky Statutes, followed the rule laid down in Crocket v. Commonwealth, 100 Ky.
382, 38 S. W. 674, in which it said: "The trial court has a sound discretion in deciding upon a motion for a change of venue and this court
will not reverse or revise his action upon such motion unlesa satisfied
the discretion has been abused." The Kentucky court has uniformly
refused to interfere with the granting of, or the failure to grant, a
change of venue by the trial court unless it has been affirmatively
shown that he has abused this discretionary power. Fish v. Benton,
138 Ky. 644, 128 S. W. 1067; MHElwain v. Commonwealth, 146 Ky. 104,
142 S. W. 234; Saylor v. Commonwealth, 158 Ky. 768, 166 S. W. 254;
Allen v. Commonwealth, 168 Ky. 225, 182 S. W. 176.
The Indiana court in construing a similar statute has refused to
disturb the rulings of the trial court until it has been affirmatively
shown that the trial court has abused his discretionary power. HenkZe
V. State, 174 Ind. 276, 91 N. D. 1090; Leach v. State, 177 Ind. 274, 91 N.
E. 792. The Missouri court went still further and held that denial of a
change of venue would not be disturbed although some time before the
trial there was such prejudice against the accused as would have prevented his having a fair and Impartial trial, in view of the large pop-
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ulation of that county from which a jury could be draWn. State v.
Thomas, 250 Mo. 189, 157 S. W. 330.
Like constructions have been placed upon similar statutes in the
following jurisdictions: McDowel v. State, 162 Ala. 25, 50 So. 324; Vanderford v. State, 126 Ga. 753, 55 S. E. 1025; State v. Hoff'2an, 134 Iowa
587, 112 N. W. 103; State v. Roberts, 95 Kan. 280, 147 Pa. 828; People
v. Swift, 172 Mich. 473, 138 N. W. 662; Downs v. State, 111 Md. 241, 18
Ann. Cas. 786; State v. Turner, 143 N. C. 641, 57 S. E. 158.
From the foregoing cases it will be seen that the Kentucky court
is in accord with the majority view in its holding. The reason for
allowing the trial court final jurisdiction under such circumstances is
clearly set forth in Howard v. Cormmonwealth, 15 Ky. Law Rep. 874,
which said, "The circuit judge has a sound discretion in deciding such
motions, and of course, better opportunity of properly estimating the
credibility of witnesses and weight of evidence than this court; and
therefore while we have the authority to revise and reverse his judgnent on such motion, it is not nor ought to be done except when we
J. C. B.
are satisfied that discretion has been abused."
DIVoRcE-BEST INTEREST OF CHILD OF DIVORCED PARENTS IS MAIN
CONsIDERATION Ix DETERMINING ITS CUsToDY-The appellee was granted

a divorce from his wife, the appellant, and was given the custody of
their three-year-old boy. The mother worked for a living and could
not be home during the day. The father placed the child in the care
of his parents. The custody of the child was one of the questions
raised on appeal. The court held the custody of the child should remain where it had been placed since it appeared to be to the best interest of the child, the mother being given reasonable opportunity to
see the child from time to time. Fertig v. Fertig, 218 Ky. 370, 291 S.
W. 706.
Kentucky Statutes, section 2123, reads: "Pending an application
for divorce, or on final judgment, the court may make orders for the
care, custody, and maintenance of the minor children of the parties
or children of unsound mind, or any of them, at any time afterward,
upon the petition of either parent, revise and alter the same, having
in all such cases of care and custody the welfare and interest of the
children principally in view." The statute was passed in 1893 and
seems only to be declaratory of the law already in existence in Kentucky at the time. In McBride v. McBride, 1 Bush 15 (1866), the court
held that as a general rule the father was entitled to the custody of
his infant child, but that the chancellor, having in view the welfare of
the child could bestow the custody to the mother, in preference to the
father, when, from the relative habits or other circumstances, it should
appear most beneficial to the child to do so.
At the common law in England the father was entitled to the custody of his minor child. The right has been upheld to the extent of
allowing the father to take an infant from its mother's breast. Rex .v
De Manneville, 5 East 221. But in this country the courts, both of law
and of equity, while recognizing the common law rule that the right to
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the custody of the child is primarily in the father, and after his death in
the mother, have modified the rule to a greater or less extent, and regarding the father's paramount right at common law as a prima facie
right, have adopted the equitable principle that this right must yield to
the considerations affecting the well-being of the child. State v. Flint,
63 Minn. 187, 65 N. W. 272; Vara v. Ward, 34 Texas A. 104, 77 S. W.
829. Tiffany on Domestic Relations, pages 343-354.
The custody is not necessarily restricted to one of the parents. In
184 Ky. 268, 211 S. W. 869, it was held that the court in awarding
custody of the infant children would be guided by the child's welfare,
and if it was imperatively required by the child's welfare the child
would be taken from both parents and custody conferred upon another better able to properly care for it. The court, however, cannot
act arbitrarily. The parental rights should always be considered. Mason
v. Williams, 165 Ky. 331, 176 S. W. 1171; Hernandez v. Thomas; 50 Fla.
522, 39 So. 641, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 203; Stapleton v. Poynter, 111 Ky.
264, 62 S. W. 730.
The question of the custody of the children is one addresed to the
sound discretion of the court. That the court must have principally
In view the welfare of the child is demonstrated in Davis v. Davis, 131
S. W. 266, 140 Ky.. 526; Shehan v. Shehan, 152 Ky. 191, 153 S. W. 243;
Colson v. Colson, 153 Ky. 68, 154 S. W. 380; Burton v. Burton, 184 Ky.
268, 211 S. W. 869; Schuck v. Sehuck, 163 Ky. 133, 173 S. W. 347; Purcell v. Purcell, 197 Ky. 627, 247 S. W. 760.
There are many circumstances to take into consideration in determining what is to the best interest of the child. The moral surroundings have great weight i4 determining the welfare of a child. In
Crabtree v. Crabtree, 27 K. L. R. 435, 85 S. W. 211, the custody of the
children was awarded to the mother, because after her separation from
the father, a paramour spent much of her time at his house. Then
health is to be considered. In Barlow v. Barlow, 28 K. L. R. 664, 90 S.
W. 216, a child of eight years .of age was awarded to the mother because the child was in delicate health and it was thought that she could
best care for it. But in Burton v. Burton, supra, the custody of a twelve
year old child was given the father because the mother was sick and
might endanger the child's health. It has been almost universally held
that the custody will go to the mother, where she is a fit person, in case
the child is of tender years. fShallcross v. Shallcross, 135 Ky. 418, 122 S.
W. 223; Duvall v. Duvall, 147 Ky. 426, 144 S. W. 78; Shehan v. Bhehan,
supra; Pope v. Pope, supra; Towles v. Towlei, 176 Ky. 225, 195 S. W.
437; Wills v. Wills, 168 Ky. 35, 181 S. W. 619; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 190
Ky. 13, 226 S. W. 119; Biggins v. Biggins, 191 Ky. 22, 228 S. W. 1330,
et al. The rule is stronger where the child is a girl. Hoffman v. Hoffman, supra; Caudill v. Caudill, 172 Ky. 460, 189 S. W. 431. As to the
ability to support see Pope v. Pope, supra, and Reitman v. Reitman,
168 Ky. 830, 183 S. W. 215, where the court held that poverty was no
reason to keep the custody of a minor child from its mother.
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In the principal case a child of tender years was given to the
father. The general rules must give away to the rule that the welfare
of the child in general is to be considered. The mother could not be
home during the day and it appeared that the father's parents could
best care for the child. Such cases are to be left to the discretion of
J. S. F.
the court.
DIVORCE-CounT SHOULD RETAIN DIVORCE CASE ON DOCKET SO THAT
01DERS AS TO CHILDREN MAY BE MODIFIED iF NEcEssAny, BUT 3F PEMrr=ES
IT MAY BE REDOOKETED FOr SUCH PuBPOSE.-Defendant
TO GO OFF Doc=
had obtained a divorce from her husband, and the custody of their seven
minor children. The claim for alimony was settled by agreement between the parties. By the terms of this agreement the husband, for
the maintenance and education of the children, conveyed to the defendant two lots. He also assigned to her a lease on these lots stipulating that the rentals so collected should go for the same purpose.
This agreement became the judgment of the court but the cause -was,
in some way, stricken from the docket. Three years later, after written
notice to the husband, the wife entered a motion to redocket the action and make a modification of that part of the judgment which provided for the maintenance of the children. She stated that at the
time of the agreement the rentals from the lease amounted to one
hundred dollars ($100) a month but since had fallen to twenty-five
dollars ($25) a month, which sum was wholly inadequate for the proper
support and maintenance of her children. Held, the proper practice
in a divorce case is for the court to retain the case on the docket to
the end that he may make such modification of orders as circumstances
call for but where he inadvertently permitted it to go off docket either
parent may, by notice to the other have the case redocketed to the end
that minor children may be properly provided for or orders as to
custody modified. Middleton v. Middleton, 218 Ky. 398, 291 S. W. 359.

From the very nature of things there can be no final judgment as
to infant children. Here the infants were not parties to this action
and could have no binding agreement if they had been. A chancellor
cannot in a divorce action finally and irrevocably fix the status or
custody of the infant children of the parties. Kentucky Statutes, section 2123. This statute was passed for the benefit of such infants and
it is clearly to their interest to allow the chancellor to have it within
his power to modify or change any order for their custody or maintenance when he feels that changed conditions demand it. Since It is
impossible to foresee what may be best for such unfortunate children
under changing conditions the Kentucky court has consistently permitted the chancellor to make any modifications affecting their custody
which he believes their general welfare requires. McFcrren v. McFerran,21 Ky. Law Rcp. 252, 51 S. W. 307; Sebastian v. Rose, 135 Ky.
197, 122 S. W. 120; Duvall v. Duvafl, 147 Ky. 426, 144 S. W. 78; Colson
v. 0o7son, 153 Ky. 68, 154 S. W. 380; W~allace v. Waflace, 171 Ky. 172,
188 S. W. 331.
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With a few minor restrictions, notably among which are the following: "that the court shall exercise a sound discretion," Morrill v.
Morrill, 83 Conn. 479, 77 Ati. 1; "that the burden is on the one claiming that fact to show that conditions have so changed since a judgment of divorce awarding the custody to one parent as to render such
parent an improper custodian, requiring that custody to be given to
another," Grego v. Schneider, 154 S. W. 361; "as new issues and changed
conditions require," Plummer v. Plummer, 154 S. W. 597. Practically
all the states have adopted a rule similar to the one followed in Kentucky and allow chancellors to modify divorce decrees in so far as -they
affect the custody and maintenance of minor children.
J. C. B.

EXE=cUORS AND ADmIN5TAToRS-PURCHrASEms AT JUDICIAL SALE o'
PnoPERnTY i PRocEss OF ADMmIsTRATIoN CAN ATTAcE VoID JUDGmENT
UJNDER WIEICa SALE WAs OnDERED.-The father of the appellant's ward
died intestate and left surviving him his widow and an infant daughter.
The appellant was appointed guardian ad litem of the infant daughter.
The mother of the appellant's ward made claim to her dower interest.
By judgment of the court the master commissioner was ordered to sefT
a certain portion of the realty to satisfy the unpaid debts of the intestate. In this action the appellant's ward, the infant daughter, was
not joined as a party defendant. Pursuant to this judgment the master
commissioner sold some of the property which was purchased by the
appellee. This sale was regularly reported and the report laid over
tor exceptions. No exceptions were taken and the sale was confirme&
The sale of this property was not sufficient to satisfy the unpaid debts
of the Intestate and under the same judgment the master commissioner
sold additional property. This sale was reported and the purchasers
filed exceptions which were overruled. On appeal the court held that
the exceptions, which were that the infant daughter had not been
joined as a party defendant, were well taken. The appellees thereupon
filed an intervening petition to the original proceeding stating these
facts and asking for a cancellation of the sale bonds which they had
executed and seeking to recover of the estate of the heir the money
they had put up on these sale bonds. Held, the judgment ordering the
sale of the property should be set aside and the bonds executed by the
appellees were null and void and should be canceled. Bowles' Guardian.
v. Johnson, 218 Ky. 2j1, 291 S. W. 29.
The court on appeal recognized the rule that in judicial sales the.
doctrine of caveat emptor is applicable for any defect in title. Williams,
et W. v. Glen's Admr., 87 Ky. 87, 7 S. W. 610; and that the judgment
under which a sale of property is ordered to be sold is separate and
distinct from that under which the sale is confirmed; that in the latter
the purchaser is a party just as though he had been formally served
with process, and if he takes no exception to the judgment ordering
the sale and a judgment confirming the same is entered, he stands in
the same position as a defendant who allows a judgment to. pass by
default against him. After the sale is confirmed and after the adjournment of the term at which it was entered that court Is without
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power to vacate the judgment. Thompson v. Porter, 183 Ky. 848, 210
S. W. 948, and if no exceptions were taken the appellate court is without power to afford the purchaser relief. Daniel's Exr. v. Compton,
151 Ky. 714, 152 S. W. 753. Under such circumstances the only relief
possible is that afforded by the Kentucky Civil Code, sections 344, 518,
520. Notwithstanding that they are well established rules there is a
distinction- from the cases presenting mere irregularities in the judgment of the court to which they are applicable and the principal case.
In the latter the court had no jurisdiction and its judgment was void,
a mere nullity. The purchaser received nothing by it and is entitled
to the relief prayed. Carpenter v. Strother's Heirs, 55 Ky. 290, 65 S.
W. 849.
A well known text states the rule followed by the principal case
thus: "The jurisdiction of many courts of record is in many cases dependent upon separate statutes in derrogation of the common law, and
specifying the manner in which it shall be employed. The decided preponderance of the adjudged cases upon the subject establishes the rule
that judgments arising from the exercise of this jurisdiction are to be
regarded in no other light, and supported by no other presumption, than
though they originated in courts not of record. The particular state
of facts necessary to confer jurisdiction will not be presumed, and if
such facts do not appear, the judgment will be treated as void." Free-man, Judgments, section 389.
Under the ancient common law neither the court of law nor equity
had jurisdiction to order the sale of an infant's real property. Elliot v.
Fowler, 112 Ky. 376, 65 S. W. 849. The provision in the Kentucky Civil
;ode, section 429 is in derrogation of that rule. The holding of the
.principal case follows the well known doctrine that such statutes are
strictly construed and is clearly right.
C. P. R.
RompiSTEAD-HomESTEA

RIGHTS ARE CREATIONS OF STATUTES, AND

THE STATUTES CREATING THEx, SUCH As KENTUOKY STATUTES,

SECTIOI

1707, DETERm E THEI ExTENT.-The appellant has occupied the homestead in question since her husband died intestate, leaving her a widow
with four minor children. Since these children attained majority, they
leased the oil and gas rights in the property to the appellees, who
entered upon the land, drilled wells and are now taking oil and gas from
them. The appellant claims that as the appellees obtained no grant from
her husband nor from her, she is entitled by virtue of her homestead
rights, to all the issue and profits taken from the land in question, including the right to operate the wells already drilled. She further asks
that the appellees be enjoined from operating thereon during the continuance of her homestead rights. Held, that under section 1707, Kentucky Statutes, no estate in land was created, but the owner of the
homestead is given the right to use, occupy and enjoy it as a home,
free from disturbance by the heirs, creditors or others. Brandenburgv.
Petroleum Exploration, et al., 218 Ky. 557, 291 S. W. 757.
The light of homestead includes only a right to occupy and use the
surface of the land, so the appellant has no property in the land or its
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contents below the surface. Appellant might have prevented the appellees from interfering with her enjoyment of the surface of the land,
but she elected to permit them to enter and received payment for the
damage caused by such entrance.
In this opinion the distinction between a life estate and homestead exemption is clearly drawn. "A life estate is a freehold interest
in land, the term of which continues during the life of the owner or of
some other person and extends to and includes all parts of the land
included in the interests of the remaindermen." "On the other hand,
a right of homestead includes only a right of occupancy and use of the
surface of the land." The tenant for life may convey his life interest or
create a lesser estate and he has a right to all the ordinary uses and
profits of the land, but he may not suffer waste. Tiffany, Real Property, 2 Vol. in 1 Ed. 1912, pp. 71, 72, Crain v. West, 191 Ky. 1, 229 S.
W. 51. The widow is given only the use of the homestead as long as
she occupies it; the title to the property is in the heirs of the husband,
and if the widow ceases to occupy the homestead, the land becomes
subject to sale for the debts of the deceased husband if there are no
minor children resulting from the marriage. Section 1707, Kentucky
G. L. B.
Statutes. Bloch v. Tarrent, et al., 122 Ky. 138.
HOmiomE-RIGHT OF PERSON, ENTERING QUARREL TO COMMIT HOMI-

CIDE IN DEFENSE OF BROTHER, HELD DEPENDENT ON BROTHER'S RIGnT OF
SELF-DEFENsE-Appellant was tried. for murder.
Appellant came
around the corner of the house as decedent was coming out through
the door, threatening appellant's brothers with a pistol. Appellant fired
a shotgun hitting the decedent. in the breast. As a result of these
wounds and others received during the quarrel the decedent died. Held,
-that the right of the appellant to enter into the quarrel and to commit
the homicide was dependent upon the right of his brother to kill in
defense of himself. NToble v. Commonwealth, 217 Ky. 556, 290 S. W. 330.
McIntyre v. Commonwealth, 191 Ky. 299, 230 S. W. 41, held that
when the son saw his father hit with a billiard ball, and threatened
with another, while his mother was engaged in trying to keep another
assailant from getting possession of a cue with which the father might
have been more seriously injured, and the son fired a pistol and killed
the assailant, he was justified in believing that the defendant or his
father was then and there in danger of death or the infliction of great
bodily harm at the hands of the deceased.
Utterbac v. Common.
wealth, 105 Ky. 723, 49 S. W. 479; McIntosh v. Commonwealth, 29 K.
L. R. 1100, 96 S. W. 917, and Watkins v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 817,
97 S. W. 740, hold similarly but emphasize the fact that one who aids
in a quarrel does so at his own risk. That is, If the one aided by the
aggressor, and the one aiding kills the other, then he who assists
will be held guilty of murder.
Pearce v. State, 4 Ala. App. 32, 58 So. 996, held, a son killing another in necessary defense of his father had same right of self-defense
as the father would have had. In Weaver v. State, 1 Ala. App. 48, 55
So. 956, it was held that a brother may defend his brother as himself.
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If the brother is at fault in provoking the assault he must retreat as
far as he can with safety before such person is justified in killing the
assailant.
,State v. Turner, 246 Mo. 598, 152 S. W. 313, and State v. Greer,
162 N. C., 640, 78 S. E. 310, hold the same way indicating that the
law has 'been well established throughout the several courts that the
defendant in an action subsequent to a homicide could not kill decedent to save a brother when the latter was in the wrong in the
difficulty arising between them.
A. K. R.
INSURANCE-ELECTION TO CONTINUE PoLICY AFTEn VIOLATION BY
Fnot NoTIcE, OR Fuom TAXING OF ADDITIONAL INSURANCE ON REPRESENTATION Or AGENT.-S. took
a fire insurance policy with defendant company for $600. The policy
contained a provision that no recovery shall be had under the policy
if at the time a loss occurred there be any other insurance covering
such loss, which would attach if this insurance had not been effected.
Later S. took out $500 additional insurance with another company
which he was carrying at the time of the car's destruction. These
facts were pleaded as a forfeiture, plaintiff relying on a waiver of forfeiture clause. The agent not only did not consent to additional Insurance but informed plaintiff that $600 was all that could be allowed
on the car. Plaintiff claims to have told the agent that this was not
enough insurance, and later told the agent that he had taken out more.
Held, that the loose, indefinite statements of plaintiff to the agent were
insufficient to give the company notice that he had in fact taken out
additional insurance or to show that with knowledge of the fact it
continued the policy in force. South v. Philadelphia Fire d Marine
Ins. Co., 217 Ky. 612, 290 S. W. 493.
It is well settled in this state that the provision in an insurance
policy for a forfeiture in the event additional insurance is taken out
by the insured may be waived. Phoenix Insurance. Co. v. ,Spiers 4
Thomas, 87 Ky. 285, 8 S. W. 453, 10 Ky. Law Rep. 254; Conn. Fire Ins.
Co. v. Moore, 154 Ky. 18, 156 S. W. 867; Ky. Growers' Ins. Co. v. Logan,
149 Ky. 453, 149 S. W. 922; Home Ins. Co. v. Ledford, 207 Ky. 212, 268
S. W. 1090. Such waiver may be inferred if the agent at the time of
the issuing of the policy consents to additional insurance being taken
or informs the insured that this may be done and the insured, in
ignorance of any limitation upon the agent's authority, and relying
upon his apparent authority does take out additional insurance. Fields
v. German American Insurance Co., 140 Mo. App. 158, 120 S. W. 697.
Waiver of a forfeiture clause of an insurance policy will be inferred
whenever such inference is reasonably deducible from the facts, McKune v. Continental Casualty Co., 28 Idaho 22, 154 Pac. 990.
The principal case differs widely on its facts from any of those
cited above. Here the agent not only did not consent to additional
insurance but informed plaintiff S. that $600 was all that the machine could carry. This in itself negatived the idea of permitting additional insurance. The casual statements of plaintiff were insufficient
TAKING ADDITION1AL INSURANICE ARISES ONLY
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to give the company notice that he had taken more insurance. Smith
v. West Branch Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 31 Pa. Super. Ct. 29. It is
essential that the company should have had knowledge or notice of that
which it is held to be estopped from insisting upon or to have waived.
Huff v. Century Life Ins. Go., 136 Iowa 464, 113 N. W. 1078; Nlorthern
Assurance Co. v. Grandview Building Association, 183 U. S., 22 S. Ct.
133.
The Kentucky court in the instant case has ably stated the rule
thus: To constitute election on the part of the insurer to continue
policy in force after additional insurance has been taken contrary to
policy, it must be shown that insurer had clear notice thereof or that
agent consented thereto and insured, in ignorance of any limitation on
agent's authority, acted in reliance on agent's representation. Such a
statement of the rule seems to us sound both in principle and reason
and finds support in the decisions of most jurisdictions.
R. R. R.
INSUnANcE-PRovisIox FOB FORFEITURE IN CASE INSURED PROPERTY
IS MORTGAGED HELD NOT AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY NOR ILLEGAL.-Appellant issued a policy of fire insurance covering the farm house of appellee. The policy contained a provision that it should be null and
void "if the property or any part thereof should thereafter become
mortgaged or encumbered." The house was destroyed by fire and appellee fied his petition seeking to recover for the loss. Appellant in
his answer pleaded a forfeiture of the policy by reason of the execution of two mortgages on the property by appellee after the policy had
been issued. Appellee demurred. Held, that the forfeiture provision
was not unreasonable, illegal nor against public policy and therefore
it must be upheld. 2Viagara Fire Insurance Co. v. Mullins, 218 Ky.
473, 291 S. W. 760.
The question presented in the principal case is: does the provision
contravene public policy or is it illegal because violative of some
statutory provision? It does not appear that the Kentucky court had
been confronted with this precise question prior to this- time. But
there are a large number of decisions to be found in the courts of other
jurisdictions.
The federal court has held that a provision in an insurance policy
that a mortgage placed upon the property insured shall render the
policy void unless the consent of the company should be indorsed
thereon in writing, is valid and enforceable. Mulrooney v. Royal Ins.
0o. of Liverpool, England, 163 Fed. 833, 90 C. C. A. 317,, aff. 157 Fed.
598. This is the general rule governing such conditions in policies
and it appears to be uniform throughout the different jurisdictions.
Security Ins. Co. v. Laird, 182 Ala. 121, 62 So. 182; Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. Liddell Co., 130 Ga. 8, 60 S. E. 104; Houdeclc v. Merchants &
Bankers Ins. Co., 102 Iowa 203, 71 N. W. 354; Riley v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
80 W. Va. 236, 92 S. E. 417, L. R. A. 1917E 983; Nortk British & Mer.
cantile Ins. Co. v. Wright, 54 Okl. 712, 154 Pac. 654; Hogue v. Farmers
Mutual Fire Ins. Go., 116 Wis. 656, 93 N. W. 849. Such conditions are
valid and enforceable notwithstanding a statute provides that the
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mere creation of a lien on the property will not avoid the policy. Johnson v. Pacific Fire Insurance Co., 19 Ga. App. 675, 91 S. E. 1067.
In some instances this may seem a hard rule. But unless an insurance company may contract against the negligence and carelessness
of the insured, the rates would otherwise necessarily increase to the
disadvantage of the general public. The careful man is penalized by
his negligent neighbor and if the risk of loss can be reduced by the
terms of the contract it is a reasonable requirement and one for the
benefit of the general public. The less interest that the owner has in
the property, the less care he is apt to take for its preservation and
protection. A mortgage placed on the property lessens the mortgagor's
interest and tends to make him more careless in the protection of it.
The court in the instant case has followed the rule which has
been uniformly established in this country. The result is a most desirable and just one.
R. R. R.
INsURANcE-STATEMETs IN PuOOs OF Loss MUST BE INTENTIONALLY
FALSE, AND DiscnosE PURPOSE TO FRAUDULENTLY OVERVALUES, OR INCLUDE
NON-EXISTENT

ITEmS, TO VITIATE PoLic.-Appellee insured her hotel

with the three appellants for $3,000, in three polices of $1,000 each,
the several policies providing that they should be void if the insured
concealed or misrepresented any material fact concerning the insurance, or in case of fraud or false swearing as to value of the property
insured. Each policy was indorsed so as to permit other insurance. In
an action by the appellee on the three policies after her hotel had been
completely destroyed by fire, appellants contended that said policies
were void, as appellee had been overinsured and had misrepresei'ted
in the proofs of loss certain articles, particularly a piano, the value of
which was overestimated at $200. The jury found that appellee had
not been guilty of bad faith, but had honestly depended upon her
memory. Held, that before a false statement under oath in proofs of
loss will vitiate a policy of insurance, such statements must be intentionally false and disclose a purpose to fraudulently overvalue. A
mere innocent mistake, or exaggerated estimate of value, is insufficient.
Hanover Fire Insurance Co., et al. v. Coffman, 218 Ky. 568, 291 S. W.
725.
The Court of Appeals, in so holding, has but restated a well established rule in Kentucky, adhered to by the courts with consistency.
Phoenix insurance Co. v. Wintersmith, 98 S. W. 987, 30 Ky. Law Rep.
369; Western Assurance Co. v. Bay, 105 Ky. 523, 49 S. W. 326; connecti
cut Fire Insurance Co. v. Union Mercantile, 161 Ky. 718, 171 S. W. 407.
Perhaps the best statement of the rule as laid down and followed In
this state is that found in Richards on Insurance, p. 144, and quoted
by the court in the authoritative case of Western Assurance Co. v.
Ray, supra. This rule, if anything, goes even further than that laid
down in the principal case and is authority for the statement that
"'an overvaluation, in order to work a forfeiture, must be so plain that
it can not be accounted for upon the principle that every man is
naturally prone to put a favorable valuation upon his own property."
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The general rule requiring intent to defraud appears to be supported unquestionably by the great weight of authority in the state
courts. 'Western Assurance Co. v. Bronstein, 77 Col. 408, 236 Pac. 1013;
Dresser v. United FiremeW's Insurance Go., 45 Hun. (N. Y.) 298;
Mississippi Fire Insurance Co. v. Dixon, 133 Miss. 570, 98 So. 101. In
the state of Idaho it has been made the subject of statutory enactment.
See Comp. St. Idaho, 1919, Sec. 5030.
In the federal courts the rule has been followed with the same
consistency and logic as in the great majority of state jurisdictions.
Alliance Insurance Co. v. Enders, 293 Fed. 485; Spring Garden Insur.
ance Co. v. Amusement Syndicate Co., 178 Fed. 519, 102 C. C. A. 29;
Columbian Insurance Co. of Indiana v. Modern Laundry, 277 Fed. 355.
It would seem evident, therefore, that Kentucky, in laying down
such a rule, has followed the substantial weight of authority, as well as
sound legal reasoning, and is in accord with the just and equitable
view of insurance law in this particular.
W. C. S.
SECTIONR 496,
CONSIDERATION WHO TAXES

Lis PENDENS-IN VIEW OF THE KENTUCKY STATUTES,

2358a-1-2358a-4, PURCHASER FOR VALUABLE

POSSESSION OF LAND PRIOR TO PERFECTING OF

IEN BY ATTACHING ANTE-

CEDENT CREDITOR IS ENTITLED TO PRIORITY THOUGH DEED WAS NOT RnCORDED UNTIL DAY AFTER ATTACHMENT AND Lis PENDENS FiLED.-Plain-

tiff brought an action in which attachment was issued and levied on
land as the property of defendant. Defendant had previously, for a
valuable consideration sold the same to a third party. The latter had
been put in possession. He had not had his deed of conveyance recorded until the day after the attachment was levied and lis pendens
notice was filed. Held, that a purchaser for a valuable consideration,
who takes possession prior to the perfecting of the lien by an attaching antecedent creditor, is entitled to priority, though the deed be not
recorded. Stone v. Keith, 218 Ky. 11, 290 S. W. 1042.
This decision is based on the Kentucky Statute 496, Section 1,
which provides: "No deed or deed of trust or mortgage conveying a
legal or equitable title to real or personal estate, shall be valid against
a purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice thereof or
against creditors until such deed (or mortgage) shall be acknowledged
or proved according to law and lodged for record."
In 1916 this section was amended by adding: "The word 'creditors'
as used herein shall include all creditors irrespective of whether or
not they may have acquired a lien by legal or equitable proceedings
or by voluntary conveyance."
The courts have construed "All Creditors" to mean subsequent
creditors whether they be secured or unsecured and such antecedent
creditors who at some time prior to the recording of the mortgage or
deed of trust have secured some equity in the property. Mason and
Moody v. Scruggs, 207 Ky. 382, 271 S. W. 833, and Larimore, et al. v.
Perkinson, et ux, 208 Ky. 382, 271 S. W. 69.
In Missouri, K. and, T. Railroad Co. v. Murphy, 75 Kansas, 707, 90
P. 290, it was held that where a railroad company Instituted proceed-
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ings to condemn a right of way, and the owner appealed on the award,
and the railroad took possession of -the land, constructed its railway,
and while the appeal was pending sold its property to another railroad
company and the appeal was granted increasing the award, the judgment so rendered was binding on the purchasing company though not
a party to-the appeal.
In Idlia Realty anel Development Co. v. Norman, 259 Mo. 619, 168
S. W. 749, where a plaintiff in an ejectment suit obtained an order
for the service of an alias summons in ejectment, on a certain day,
when defendant was in possession, and later defendant- conveyed the
property to a corporation controlled by him, action was maintainable
against the defendant and the corporation being a pendente lite purchaser, was bound by any judgment secured therein.
The position taken by the Kentucky and Kansas courts as well
as that taken in Missouri indicate the fact that the law is well settled
.A. K. R.
on this point.
MANDAmus-PnopEn REMEDY Pon COLLECTING SUm ALLowED ay CrT=
ORDInANCE IS MANDAMUS TO Co3EL CrTy TREASURER TO PAY.-Appellant was retained by city council -to represent the city touching certain
charges against the mayor. In an action against the city for the value
of his services appellant, in his amended petition, set out the fact that
the council, by passage of an ordinance, had allowed him five hundred
dollars. It was found by the court that the ordinance was not legally
passed under section 3059 of Kentucky Statutes. The court considered,
however, the form of action which should be brought had the ordinance
been legally passed. Held, that the proper action was mandamus, in
as much as the city, by passing the ordinance had done all in its power
to allow the claim. Cisco v. City of Ashland, 218 Ky. 53, 290 S. W. 1032.
In order for mandamus to lie in Kentucky against an official it
must appear that it -is the legal duty of the respondent to do that which
it is sought to compel him to do. The duty must be ministerial and
not discretionary. Lowe v. Phelps, 14 Bush (Ky.) 642; Norman v.
Board of Managers, 93 Ky. 537, 20 S. W. 201. The principal case
clearly falls within this doctrine. Had the ordinance been legally
passed, as appellant contended, the city treasurer's duty, as agent of
the city, would have been purely ministerial, and appellant's remedy,
according to the well accepted Kentucky rule, is mandamus. The general rule is well established. Page, Second Auditor v. Hardin, 8 B.
Monroe (Ky.) 648; Judge and Justices of the Clark County Court v.
.P. W. d K. R. Turnpike Co., 11 B. Monroe (Ky.) 143.
If appellant's claim against the city had been unliquldated, or in
other words unallowed, then mandamus would not lie, and an action
directly against the city would have been proper. Garrard County
Court v. McKee, 11 Bush (Ky.) 234; Judge and Justices of Hickman
County Court v. Moore, 2 Bush (Ky.) 108.
The rule laid down in the Instant case is in accord with that of
the majority of state jurisdictions. A case decidedly in point both on
the facts and holding Is Bloomfleld v. Bay City, 192 Mich. 488, 158 N.
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W. 1043. Plaintiff was hired by city park commission as engineer, said
commission having authority to do so by statute. Plaintiff's claim was
not properly allowed and the action was brought against the city in
assumpsit. The court observed in its opinion, just as did the Kentucky tribunal, that "if defendant's board had performed its legal duty,
there being no question of the amount of the demand, payment by
the city would be enforced only by mandamus proceedings." Other cases
following the rule as applied generally are State, ex rel. Sprague v.
Greenbrier County Court, et at, 93 W. Va. 481, 117 S. E. 135; People v.
Mead, 24 N. Y. 114; Ray v. Wilson, 29 Fla. 342, 1& So. 613; Harrington
v. Berkshire County Commissioners, 22 Pick (Mass.) 263, 33 Am. Dec.
741.
Except In cases concerning the federal government, the United
States courts will only issue a writ of mandamus in aid of an existing
jurisdiction, and it has been held that a proceeding for an original
writ is not removable to the federal courts. A judgment obtained is
a condition precedent. Davenport v. County of Dodge, 105 U. S. 237,
26 U. S. (Law Ed.) 1019; Rosenbaum v. Board of Supervisors, 11 Sawy
621, 82 Fed. 224; State of Indiana v. Lake Erie Ry., etc., 85 Fed. 3.
Kentucky, it is clear, is in accord with the majority rule, which
seems to be accepted generally. Logically it is correct.
W. C. S.
MuNicirA CoroRATIos-Crry is NoT LiBiir FOp FmmUxE To FunNmSn WATER ron FInE PRoTECTIoN-CITY is NoT LiABLE Fon FAmuRE IN
EXERCISE OF GOVERNmENTAL FUNCTION TO FURNISH WATER FOR FIRE PRo.
TEcToN.-The appellant alleged that the appellee had entered into a
contract whereby the appellee was obligated to furnish water for fire
protection and that by reason of the appellee's failure to perform such
obligation his dwelling was destroyed by fire. It was shown on trial
that the appellee was obligated to supply the appellant with water
for domestic purposes only and that the appellee's failure to supply
water for fire protection was a failure in the exercise of a governmental
function and not a failure in the performance of a contractual obligation for which the appellee was to receive compensation. It was held
that the appellee was not liable for its failure in the exercise of a
purely governmental function to supply water for fire protection.
Philips,et al. v. City of Elizabethtown, 218 Ky. 428, 291 S. W. 358.
It has been the tendency of Kentucky courts to draw a distinction
between contracts entered into by cities for commercial benefit and
-those whereby they gratuitously assume obligations for public benefit
aside from compensation and commercial gain. When a city undertakes to supply its citizens with water for domestic purposes, It has
taken upon itself a contractual obligation for which it is to receive
compensation and it is liable to every individual with whom it contracts for failure In performance. But when a city undertakes to
furnish water for fire protection it is liable to the individual citizen
only when it Is definitely shown that there is a contract between the
city and the individual so providing. Philips v. Kentucky Utilities Co.,
206 Ky. 151, 266 S. W. 1064. In the absence of such contract, the city
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is held to be exercising a governmental function when it undertakes to
furnish water for fire protection. TerreZ v. Louisville Water Co., 127
Ky. 77, 105 S. W. 100.
"So far as municipal corporations of any class and, however incorporated, exercise powers conferred upon them for purposes essentially public, purposes pertaining to the administration of general
laws, made to enforce the general policy of the state--they should be
deemed agencies of the state and not subject to be sued except by
statute." Tymanl's Admr. v. Board of Council of Frankfort, 117 Ky.
518, 78 S. W. 446. The city's undertaking to furnish water for fire
protection is one that is essentially public in its nature and one made
to uphold a public policy, namely that of protecting private property.
The city receiving no compensation for such undertaking cannot be
held liable for a failure in the undertaking as would an individual
or private corporation undertaking to do the same thing for a consideration. It is a purely governmental function and the court is in
line with the authorities of other jurisdictions in holding that a city
is not liable for a failure in the exercise of such a governmental function. Wallace v. City of Baltimore, 123 Md. 638, 91 A. 687; Butterworth
v. City of Henrietta, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 467, 61 S. W. 975; Van Horn v.
City of Des Moines, 63 Iowa 447, 19 N. W. 293; Tainter v. City Worcester, 123 Mass. 311, 25 Am. Rep. 90; Wheeler v. City of Cincinnati,
19 0. St. 19.
R. B. B.
NAMES OF FIRM-FILING SAmE--THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO COMPLY WITH KENTUCKY STATUTES, SEcs. 199b-1, 571, IN DOING BUSINESS
UNDER THE NAME OF A CORPORATION THAT HAD BEEN DISSOLVED AND IN
FAILING

TO FILE REQUIRED

STATEMENT IS

NO DEFENSE

TO ACTION ON

ron TOWING CHAR0ES.-Plaintiff sued on a
contract to tow certain coal and other freight, entered into March 1,
1923. Defendant pleaded that plaintiff was transacting business under
the assumed name of the Bardstown Navigation Company in violation
of section 199b-1, Kentucky Statutes; that plaintiff had not filed a
statement setting forth the name of the persons owning or transacting the business as required by section 571, Kentucky Statutes. Held,
that failure to comply with statutes 199b-1, 571, is no defense to action
on a contract. Traut v. Carter,218 Ky. 210, 291 S. W. 36.
The trial court in dismissing the plaintiff's petition because he
had failed to comply with section 199b-1, Kentucky Statutes, followed
the decision of this court in Hunter v. Big Four Auto Co., 162 Ky. 778,
173 S. W. 120, L. R. A. 1915 D, 987, which has been followed in several
subsequent cases. But these cases were overruled in Hayes v. Providence Savings d- Trust Co. (Ky.), 290 S. W. 1028, in which it was held
that the failure of the plaintiff to comply with this statute rendered
him liable to a fine, but the statute does not make void contracts made
by the plaintiff before he complied with the statute.
The object of the legislature in passing section 199b-1 was to prevent a partnership from obtaining a false credit; that it would furnish
the debtor of an offending firm with a defense to an action on a conCONTRACT WITH DEFENDANT

GASB CoMMENS
tract to do a thing in itself legitimate, was plainly not contemplated
by the lawmakers. The ruling in the principal case, confirming the
decision in Hayes v. Providence Savings and Trust Co. (supra), brings
Kentucky dn line with the holdings of the courts in the other states
of the union.
The Nonparial, 1905, 145 Fed. 521; Segal v. Fylar, 1915, 89 Conn.
2993, 93 Atl. 1027; Kusnetzky, v. Security Insurance Co. (Mo.), 281 S.
W. 47; Piggly-Wiggly Stores v. Loewenstein (Ind.), 1925, 147 N. E. 771;
PennsylvaniaLumber Co. v. Condon, 1923, 120 Atl. 546.
G. L. B.
SALES-DAmAGEs ron A BREACi OF WARRANTy or LIGHTInG PLANT IS
DIFFERENCE IN FAIM MARKET VALUE OF PLANT IN CONDITION IN WHICH
IT WAS AT Timu OF SALE AS CONTRASTED WITH FAIR MARsr VALUE HAD
IT BEEN IN CONDITION IN WHICH IT WAS WARRANTED TO BE.-Appellants

sold to appellees a carbide gas generating plant. By the written cctntract of sale the appellants warranted this generating plant to be a
thoroughly durable galvanized steel acetylene generator, automatic in
action, and of good material and workmanship. In a suit by appellants to recover on a note for purchase price of plant, the appellees set
up a counterclaim for breach of warranty. Held, evidence was insuffclent to support a verdict for the buyer. J. B. Colt Company v. Berry,
et al., 218 Ky. 119, 290 S. W. 1059.
There Is no doubt, but that if the weight of evidence had shown
such substantial shortcomings in respect thereof as was alleged in the
breach of warranty, such evidence would have justified or upheld the
claim of the appellees in this case, and appellees would have received
damages for breach of warranty of lighting plant, which would have
been the difference in fair market value of -plantin condition In which
it was at time of sale as contrasted with fair market value had it been
in condition In which it was warranted to be. This general rule for
the measure of damages for breach of warranty in a sale is the law
in Kentucky and is well settled by the following decisions: Barnardv.
Napier, 167 Ky. 824, 181 S. W. 624; Haums v. Surran, 168 Ky. 686, 182
S. W. 927; Mosby v. Larue, 143 Ky. 433, 136 S. W. 887; Harringanv.
Advance Thresher Co., 26 Ky. Law Rep. 317, 81 S. W. 261; Marbury
Lumber Co. v. Stearns Mfg. Co., 32 Ky. Law Rep. 739, 107 S. W. 200. This
general rule is firmly established in New York. Joy v. Hopkins, 5
Denio 84; Hale v. Sanborn, 3 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 195; Masterton v. Mayor
d etc., of Brooklyn, 7 Hill 68; Zuller v. Rogers, 7 Hun. 541; Whitney v.
Allaire, 1 N. Y. 312. The measure of damages is the difference between
the actual value of the horse at the time of the sale and what it would
have been worth if it had been as warranted. Douglas, et al. v. Moses,
89 Ia. 40, 56 N. W. 271. Measure of damages for breach of warranty of
soundness is difference between actual value and value as warranted.
Brown v. Bigelou,3
10 Allen (Mass.) 244; Kuntzman v. Weaver, 20 Pa.
422. The rule is well settled in Tennessee that the measure of damages for breach of a warranty of soundness is the difference in value
of the property at the time and place of sale, if sound, and its value in
its unsound state. McGavock v. Woods, 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 181. The
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measure of damages for breach of warranty of quality, or deceit in
sale of chattel, is the difference between its value as furnished, and
its value had it been as warranted. Voorhees v. Earl, 2 Hill (N. Y.)
288; Stiles v. White, 11 Metcalf (Mass.) 356. The modern view Is that
the buyer may recover as general damages the difference between the
actual value of the article sold and what would have been its value if
it had been as warranted, and is not to be restricted to a recovery of
the difference between the actual value of the chattel and the price
paid. Marsh v. McPherson, 105 U. S. 709; Gustafson v. Rustemeyer, 70
Conn. 125, 39 At. 104; Williams v. HcFadden, 23 Fla. 143, 1 So. 618.
This general rule for the measure of damages for a breach of
warranty is firmly established, not only in Kentucky, but in many of
the other states throughout the country.
B. C.

Wrr.ms-DEvisE OF RE
qAiNDEsTO BODILY HEIS OF LIFm TE1NAT
WITH REAiNDEn OvER, SHOULD Sn E Dm "NOT LEAvING BODILY HEMS,"
HELD, Nor TO HAvE VESTED FEE IN SOLE CHILD OF Lim TENANT PREDECEASING HER MoTHEm&-Property was devised to the plaintiff by a will
using these words: "All my property of every kind, real and personal,
I will and bequeath to my daughter E. (the plaintiff),, and after her
death to go to her bodily heirs. The interest conveyed my daughter in
property of every kind is for and during her natural life and after
her death to descend to her lawful bodily heirs. In case my daughter
should die not leaving any bodily heirs then all of the property bequeathed to her to revert to my estate and descend to my brothers and
sisters or to their representatives; . . ." The plaintiff had a
daughter living at the death of the testatrix who died before the commencement of this suit. Plaintiff contends that the remainder vested
in the child at the death of the testatrix and upon her death, she, the
plaintiff, inherited the fee. Held, that the plaintiff had a life estate in
the property so devised; with a defeasible remainder in fee in the
brothers and sisters of the testatrix. Weber, et al. v. Schroeder, 218
Ky. 442, 291 S. W. 739.
In its construction of the clause above quoted the Court of Appeals
stated that the remainder in fee to the heirs of the life tenant was a
defeasible one subject to being defeated by death of the remainderman
before that of the life tenant. The remainder over to the brothers and
sisters of the testatrix was also a defeasible one subject to being defeated by the subsequent birth of a child who would survive the life
tenant. The court in the case of Harvey v. Bell, 118 Ky. 512, 81 S. W.
671, attempted to settle the rule dealing with this subject which at that
time appeared to be in much confusion. Atkins v. Kearns, et al., 210
Ky. 824, 276 S. W. 977. It there laid down rules of construction to be
applied to gifts with remainder over should the devisee die "without
leaving issue." They were, first: If the gift to such a devisee were
preceded by a life estate the words "dying without issue" were limited
to the prior estate, and upon its termination the devisee took the proper.ty absolutely. Wilson v. Morrill, 205 Ky. 257, 265 S. W. 774. Second:
Property devised to two or more Infants with the provision that should
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any one or more die without leaving living Issue then the property
should pass to the remainder of the class, the words "dying without
leaving living issue" likewise refers to a death of the devisee before
reaching his majority. Linton v. Hail, et al., 201 Ky. 698, 258 S. W. 111.
Third: When the devise is to a class and the period of division is postponed, the provision as to "dying without leaving issue" is limited to
the time during which the division is postponed, Webster v. Webster,
et al., 93 Ky. 632, 21 S. W. 332. Fourth: Contrary to the foregoing rules
where there is no intervening estate; and no other period to which the
words "dying without issue" might reasonably be said to have reference; then the devise is held to create a defeasible fee subject to being
defeated by the death of the devisee at any time without having Issue.
The principal case falls within the fourth classification which is
now the settled rule in Kentucky. Harvey v. BelT, supra; Bacon v.
Dickinson, 199 Ky. 121, 250 S. W. 807; Atkinson v. Kearns, 210 Ky. 824,
276 S. W. 977. It seems that the rule of the Kentucky court is the
minority view since in many jurisdictions it is held that the time to
which the words "dying without issue" has reference is limited to the
life of the testator. Lawler v. Holohan, 70 Conn. 87, 38 Atl. 903; Mahoney v. Mahoney, 98 Conn. 525, 120 Atl. 342; .Burnhamv. Burnham,
101 Conn. 529, 126 AtI. 704; Stokes v. Weston, 142 N. Y. 433, 37 N. E.
515; Brown v. Gardner, 233 N. Y. 261, 135 N. E. 325; Morrison v. Truby,
145 Pa. 540, 22 Atl. 972; In re Seewald's Estate, 281 Pa. 483, 127 Atl. 63.
It Is submitted that the principal case is right in that it follows
the adjudged cases of this jurisdiction which are based upon sound
logic rather than bare authority.
C. P. R.

